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Abstract. This paper studies a general equilibriummodel with two groups ofagents, investors (shareholders)
and managers of ﬁrms, in which managerial eﬀort is not observable and inﬂuences the probabilities of ﬁrms’
outcomes. Shareholders of each ﬁrm oﬀer the manager an incentive contract which maximizes the ﬁrm’s
market value, under the assumption that the ﬁnancial markets are complete relative to the possible outcomes
of the ﬁrms. The paper studies two sources of ineﬃciency of equilibrium. First, when investors are risk averse
and eﬀort inﬂuences probability, market-value maximization diﬀers from maximization of expected utility.
Second, because the optimal contract exploits all sources of information for inferring managerial eﬀort, when
ﬁrms’ outputs are correlated the contract of a manager depends on the outcomes of other ﬁrms. This leads
to an external eﬀect of the eﬀort of one manager on the compensation of other managers, which market-value
maximization ignores. We show that under typical conditions these two eﬀects lead to an underprovision of
eﬀort in equilibrium. These ineﬃciencies disappear however if each ﬁrm is replicated, and in the limit there
is a continuum of ﬁrms of each type.An Equilibrium Model of Managerial Compensation
Introduction
In the 1990’sexecutive compensation evolved towardshigh-powered incentive contracts designed
to align the incentives of CEOs with the interests of their ﬁrms’ shareholders.1 The economic model
which has come to serve as the basis for discussing incentive contracts and executive compensation
is the principal-agent model. However the CEO of a large corporation runs the ﬁrm not for a single
principal but for many principals, namely all the shareholders of the ﬁrm. To avoid the diﬃculties
of a model with multi-principals it is typically assumed that ﬁrms’ shareholders are risk neutral,
so that they all agree to choose contracts which maximize ﬁrms’ net expected proﬁts. However the
high equity premium observed on the stock market shows that risk neutrality of shareholders is
not a realistic assumption, and it can not be adopted in a model that studies the relation between
executive compensation and prices on the ﬁnancial markets.
The second element which is missing in a discussion of CEO compensation in the context of
a bilateral principal-agent model, is the important stylized fact that ﬁrms’ proﬁts are typically
strongly correlated. This suggests that ﬁrms’ outcomes are aﬀected by common factors and that
the optimal contract of a CEO should take this into account by incorporating some element of
relative performance.
In this paper we present a model which combines the determination of executive compensation
studied in the principal-agent model with an equilibrium model of ﬁnancial markets, and which per-
mits these two stylized facts—risk aversion of the shareholders and correlation of ﬁrms’ outcomes—
to be taken into account. The model consists of a two-period economy with two groups of agents, I
investors (or shareholders) and K managers of K ﬁrms, in which managerial eﬀort is not observable
and inﬂuences the probabilities of the ﬁrms’ outcomes. To simplify the model the assignment of
managers to ﬁrms is taken as given. At date 0 there is trade on the ﬁnancial markets and the share-
holders (or the Board of Directors) of each ﬁrm oﬀer an incentive contract to the ﬁrm’s manager.
We make two additional simplifying assumptions: ﬁrst the ﬁnancial markets are complete relative
to the possible outcomes of ﬁrms, and second, managers cannot undo the incentive contracts they
are oﬀered by trading on the ﬁnancial markets. The hypothesis of complete ﬁnancial markets per-
1The evolution is clear when comparing Murphy’s recent assessment of CEO compensation (Murphy (2001)) with
that in Jensen-Murphy (1990).
1mits optimal contracts to be deﬁned in the presence of many principals: all the shareholders of a
ﬁrm agree with the objective of choosing the manager’s contract to maximize the present value of
its proﬁt or, equivalently, the market value of the ﬁrm.
The object of this paper is to study the normative properties of the equilibria of this model,
which embeds a family of principal-agent models (one for each ﬁrm) into a model of ﬁnancial
market equilibrium. Does the choice of contracts which maximize market value lead to an optimal
choice of eﬀort for the ﬁrms’ managers? We ﬁnd that the conditions under which market-value
maximization leads to constrained Pareto optimality are restrictive: investors must be risk neutral
and ﬁrms’ outcomes must be independent. Thus under the assumptions which best reﬂect the
stylized facts about equity markets—risk-averse investors and correlated outcomes of ﬁrms—the
equilibrium levels of managerial eﬀort are not socially optimal.
To clarify the sources of the ineﬃciency we decompose the study of the model into two special
cases. In the ﬁrst, investors are risk averse but we retain the assumption of independence of ﬁrms’
outcomes; in the second, ﬁrms’ outcomes are correlated but investors are taken to be risk neutral.
There are several ways of modeling the correlationof ﬁrms’ outcomes: here we assume that ﬁrms are
aﬀected by a common shock. This gives a relatively precise structure to the model, and in keeping
with the key hypothesis of the principal-agent model, that idiosyncratic shocks are unobservable,
we make the assumption that the common shock is not observable either.
The ﬁrst source of ineﬃciency, linked to the risk aversion of the shareholders, comes from the
structural property of the principal-agent model, that managerial eﬀort aﬀects the probabilities of
the ﬁrms’outcomes. When investorstrade on the ﬁnancial marketsthey evaluate the probabilitiesof
outcomes—correctly under the assumption of rational expectations—and this evaluation inﬂuences
the security prices. But eﬀort shifts probabilities, and security prices do not provide a signal of the
value of shifting probabilities. Rather they provide a well-deﬁned value for income in each state,
expressed by the stochastic discount factor that is used by the ﬁrms to maximize proﬁt. We show
that under these circumstances maximizing a weighted sum of expected utilities of the investors
(what a planner does) and maximizing the present value of the ﬁrms’ proﬁts (what the equilibrium
does) give diﬀerent results, the equilibrium leading to an underprovision of eﬀort.
The second source of ineﬃciency, linked to the correlation of ﬁrms’ outcomes, is perhaps more
intuitive since it induces an externality between the actions of the ﬁrms’ managers—and markets
typically fail to take externalities into account. An optimal contract rewards a manager in circum-
stances which are more likely to occur with high eﬀort and penalizes the manager in circumstances
which are more likely with low eﬀort. All available sources of information are used to infer the
2likelihood of eﬀort for a given outcome. In the presence of a common shock, the realized outcomes
of other ﬁrms provide information on the value of the common shock and hence by inference on
the likelihood of the manager’s eﬀort. However since the outcomes of the other ﬁrms are in turn
inﬂuenced by the eﬀort levels of their managers, the use of information creates an externality of
the eﬀort of one manager on the expected utility of other managers. We show that the externality
is quite subtle and can be decomposed into two separate eﬀects arising from an increase in eﬀort
on the part of a manager. The ﬁrst, which we call the direct eﬀect, is to decrease the compensation
of other managers: this is akin to a standard negative externality. The second, which we call the
information eﬀect is to change the likelihood ratios of the managers of other ﬁrms thereby chang-
ing the information that is used to deduce the eﬀort of the managers from the outcomes of their
ﬁrms: this is akin to a positive externality. We show that if the correlation of ﬁrms’ outcomes is
suﬃciently strong, then the information eﬀect tends to dominate, leading to an underprovision of
eﬀort in equilibrium.
Thus market value maximization does not lead to a socially optimal choice of managerial eﬀort.
However the ineﬃciencies may be small: in particular, if the individual ﬁrms are replicated and in
the limit replaced by a continuum of identical ﬁrms with identical managers and independent (or
conditionally independent) outcomes, then the ineﬃciencies disappear. The result of constrained
optimality of equilibrium, obtained in insurance models with a continuum of agents of each type,
alsoobtains here. Nevertheless, if the assumption of a continuum of ﬁrms is convenient for cancelling
the ineﬃciencies which are the subject of this paper, it is a much less natural assumption to make
for analyzing the contracts of CEOs of large corporations than the assumption of a continuum of
identical agents in a model of insurance under moral hazard.
1. The model
Consider a one-good, two-period economy in which there are two groups of agents, I investors and
K managers, and a collection of K ﬁrms, each run by one of the managers. The match between
managers and ﬁrms is taken as given, so that the only option that remains is that manager k runs
ﬁrm k or takes an outside option yielding a utility level νk. Uncertainty is described by a ﬁnite
number of possible outcomes for each ﬁrm at date 1: for ﬁrm k the outcomes are yk
sk,s k ∈ Sk,





. A state of the economy at date
1i saK-uple s =( s1,...,s K) describing the the realized output (or proﬁt) of each ﬁrm: we let
S = S1×...×SK denote the state space, ys =( y1
s1,...,yK
sK), s ∈ S, denoting the vector of outputs
3of the K ﬁrms in state s.
To study an equilibrium model of managerial compensation in the presence of moral hazard
we assume that the probabilities of the possible outcomes of ﬁrm k are inﬂuenced by the en-
trepreneurial input (eﬀort for short) of its manager, ek ∈ |R+, which is assumed to be unobserv-
able. To permit common as well as idiosyncratic shocks to inﬂuence the outcomes of the ﬁrms let
p(s,e)=p(s1,...,s K,e 1,...,e K) denote the joint probability of the outcomes, given the eﬀort lev-
els e =( e1,...,e K) chosen by the managers. The function p is assumed to be common knowledge
for the agents in the economy. When we need to focus on the (representative) ﬁrm k, it will be con-
venient to use the notation s =( sk,s −k) and e =( ek,e −k), where s−k =( s1,...,s k−1,s k+1,...,s K)
and e−k is deﬁned in the same way.
All agents in the economy, investors and managers, are assumed to have expected-utility pref-
erences over date 1 consumption streams—at date 0 agents make trades on ﬁnancial markets and
write contracts, but there is no date 0 consumption. Let ui denote the VNM utility index of in-
vestor i, i ∈ I, and vk that of manager k, k ∈ K. The disutility of eﬀort for manager k is assumed
to enter additively and is expressed by a cost function ck(ek).
Each ﬁrm is owned by a subset of investors with ownership shares δi
k, i ∈ I, k ∈ K, δi
k denoting
the share of investor i in ﬁrm k. While we have in mind that investors trade on equity markets and
hedge their risks by using options and derivative markets, it will simplify the analysis to assume
an equivalent complete ﬁnancial market structure consisting of a complete set of Arrow securities,
security s promising to deliver 1 unit of good (income) in state s and nothing otherwise. These
securities are traded at date 0, with ˆ πs denoting the price of security s.
At date 0, the shareholders of ﬁrm k choose the contract τk =( τk
s ,s∈ S) that they propose
to their manager. Since manager k acts as an agent for several principals, we cannot assume as
in the standard principal-agent model that each shareholder chooses the contract that maximizes
his/her utility. On the other hand since markets are complete with respect to outcomes, the present




s ) is well deﬁned and all shareholders will agree with the
objective of choosing the contract for manager k which maximizes the present value of the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt (its market value). We are thus led to the following concept of equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1. A managerial equilibrium is a pair of actions and prices (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e, ¯ π)=( ( ¯ xi)i∈I,
(¯ τk,¯ ek)k∈K,¯ π) consisting of consumption streams for investors, contracts and eﬀort levels for
managers, and prices, such that
(i) for k ∈ K, shareholders of ﬁrm k choose (¯ τk,¯ ek), the contract of the manager and the eﬀort





s )¯ πsp(s,ek,¯ e−k)
on the set of (τk,e k) ∈ |RS










s )p(s,ek,¯ e−k) − ck(ek) | ek ∈ |R+
)
(ICk)
(ii) for i ∈ I, investor i chooses the optimal consumption stream
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The same deﬁnition without the incentive constraints (ICk) deﬁnes a managerial equilibrium
with observable eﬀort, which is a useful reference concept for clarifying the eﬀect of moral hazard.
If all the agents’ consumption streams are positive and all managers exert positive eﬀort levels in
the equilibrium, we will say that the equilibrium is interior.
Remark 1: (i) expresses the proﬁt maximizationof the ﬁrms, which deﬁnes the interaction between
markets and contracts: the shareholders of each ﬁrm (or its Board of Directors) choose the contract
which maximizes the present value of its proﬁt, subject to the usual participation and incentive
constraints. Of course this is a simpliﬁed view of the way executive compensation is chosen, for
it assumes that the interests of the shareholders are perfectly taken into account by the Board of
Directors. It also makes the simplifying assumption that the ﬁrms’ managers do not have access to
ﬁnancial markets, so that the managers’ consumption streams coincide with their compensation:
xk = τk, k ∈ K. In some cases, for example when the ﬁrms’ outcomes are independent, this is not
5too restrictive an assumption since the optimal contracts induce optimal risk sharing subject to
the incentive constraint, and would not change if managers could trade all securities except those
related to the ﬁrm they manage. However the model factors out the possibility that managers have
other sources of income which change the share of their income which is “at risk” in case of a bad
outcome for their ﬁrm, and hence alter the incentive properties of the compensation oﬀered by the
contracts.
We do not model the market for managers, and the optimal matching of managers to ﬁrms:
instead we assume that the optimal matching has be done and, in the spirit of the principal-agent
literature, we take as exogenous the expected utility that managers can obtain in their second best
options. The resulting model is the simplest extension of the principal-agent model to a general
equilibrium setting which permits us to study whether contracts determined by proﬁt maximization
lead to a second-best optimum. To maximize proﬁt, or equivalently the market value of the ﬁrm,
the shareholders must anticipate how the manager’s eﬀort inﬂuences the market value of the ﬁrm.
The expression for the proﬁt in (i) and the relation (iii) between ¯ πs and the Arrow-Debreu prices
ˆ πs combine rational expectations and a competitive assumption. In equilibrium agents correctly
anticipate the eﬀort levels ¯ e of the managers, and hence the probability p(s,¯ e) of the diﬀerent
outcomes. From this they can deduce ¯ πs, the stochastic discount factor for state s, which is
constant with risk neutrality and varies with the aggregate output with risk aversion. This is the
rational expectations part. In the calculation of the market value of the ﬁrm in (i), ¯ πs as well as
the eﬀort of the other managers, ¯ e−k, are taken as given, and only the eﬀect of the manager ’s
eﬀort ek on the probability p(s,ek,¯ e−k) is taken into account. This is the competitive part of the
anticipations assumption.
To study the normative properties of a managerial equilibrium we will compare it with the
allocation that would be chosen by a planner seeking to maximize social welfare subject to the
same incentive constraints as those faced by the ﬁrms’ shareholders.
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s )p(s,ek,¯ e−k) − ck(ek) | ek ∈ |R+
)
(ICk)
An allocation (x,τ,e)i sconstrained Pareto optimal (CPO) if it is constrained feasible and there
does not exist another constrained feasible pair which is weakly preferred by all agents, and strictly
6by at least one agent. The same deﬁnition without the incentive constraints (ICk) deﬁnes a ﬁrst
best optimum.
First-order conditions. A natural approach to comparing equilibrium allocations (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e) with
constrained Pareto optimal allocations is to compare the ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs) for equilib-
rium and constrained optimality. To derive the FOCs, consider a setting in which the incentive








k(ek) = 0 (IC0
k)
Let (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e,¯ π) be an interior equilibrium. To simplify notation2 set p(s,e)=ps. Then there exists
a vector of multipliers (¯ λ, ¯ β, ¯ µ)=( ( ¯ λi)i∈I,(¯ βk, ¯ µk)k∈K) ≥ 0 such that
(i) u0
i(¯ xi
s)=¯ λi¯ πs,s ∈ S, i ∈ I
(ii)









































where ¯ λi is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint in investor i’s utility maximization
problem, and (¯ βk, ¯ µk) are the multipliers associated with the participation constraint (PCk) and
the transformed incentive constraint (IC0
k) for manager k. If eﬀort is observable, the incentive
constraints do not exist (are not binding) and the FOCs are the same with ¯ µ = 0. If eﬀort is
unobservable and (IC0
k) is binding, the second term in (iii) is equal to zero.
If (x,τ,e) is an interior constrained Pareto optimal allocation then for some positive weights
(α,β) ∈ |RI+K
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s)=0 ,s ∈ S (RCs)
2Depending on the circumstances we will use the notation p(s,e)o rp(sk,s
−k,e k,e
−k), or, in complex expressions,








k(ek)=0 ,k ∈ K (IC0
k)
where the incentive constraints (ICk) have been replaced by the ﬁrst-order conditions (IC0
k). Thus
there will exist non-negative multipliers ((πs)s∈S,(µk)k∈K such that
(i)∗ αiu0
i(xi
























































where αi (resp βk) is the weight of investor i (manager k) in the social welfare function, πs (or more
accurately πsps) is the multiplier associated with the resource constraint for state s, and µk is the
multiplier associated with the incentive constraint for manager k. As before, if eﬀort is observable
µ = 0, while if eﬀort is not observable the third term in (iii)∗ is equal to zero.
The FOCs (i), (ii) and (i)∗, (ii)∗ which describe how risk is distributed between investors and
managers so as to induce the appropriate eﬀort on the part of the managers are the same, implying
that the contracts which are optimal from the point of view of the shareholders to induce given
eﬀort levels of the managers are also the socially eﬃcient way of inducing this eﬀort. The FOCs
(iii) and (iii)∗ however are diﬀerent: while they evaluate the marginal cost of an additional unit of
eﬀort by manager k in the same way, they diﬀer in the way they evaluate its marginal beneﬁt. For
the planner, the social beneﬁt is measured by its eﬀect on the expected utility of all other agents
in the economy, namely all investors i ∈ I and all managers j ∈ K,j 6= k, with incentive-corrected
weights, while in equilibrium the marginal beneﬁt of manager’ k eﬀort is measured by its eﬀect
on the proﬁt of ﬁrm k. We will show however that these apparently distinct ways of measuring
marginal beneﬁt in fact coincide when investors are risk neutral (ui(xi)=xi) and ﬁrms’ outcomes
are independent. Proving this property will then suggest that in all other cases the FOCs for
optimal eﬀort (iii) in equilibrium and (iii)∗ in a social optimum are diﬀerent.
Deﬁnition: The random outcomes of the ﬁrms are independent if for each k ∈ K there exists a





8Since the FOCs are necessary but, because of possible non-convexities, are not always suﬃcient
for constrained eﬃciency we will show that under risk-neutrality and independence a managerial
equilibrium is CPO without calling on the ﬁrst-order conditions.
Proposition 1. If all investors are risk neutral and ﬁrms’ outcomes are independent, if the
VNM utility indices of the managers are strictly concave and satisfy vk(c) →− ∞as c → 0, , then
a managerial equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal.
Proof. Let (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e, ¯ π) be a managerial equilibrium. We ﬁrst show that ¯ τk(sk,s −k) depends only
on sk and is independent of the realizations s−k of the other ﬁrms. Suppose not, i.e. suppose that
for two outcome states s =( sk,s −k) and s0 =( s0
k,s 0−k), with sk = s0
k, we have ¯ τk(s) 6=¯ τk(s0). For
a random variable ξ : S → |R, let Ee(ξ)=
P
s∈S p(s,e)ξ(s) denote its expectation given the vector







p(s−k,¯ e−k)vk(¯ τk(sk,s −k)) (1)
Deﬁne ˜ τ(sk)=
P
s−k∈S−k p(s−k,¯ e−k)(¯ τk(sk,s −k)). Since ¯ τk(s) 6=¯ τk(s0), by strict concavity of vk
there exists b(·) ≥ 0 such that
vk(˜ τk(sk) − b(sk)) =
X
s−k∈S−k
p(s−k,¯ e−k)vk(¯ τk(sk,s −k)) (2)
with b(sk) > 0 for at least one sk. If manager k is oﬀered the contract ˜ τk(sk) − b(sk) for sk ∈ Sk,
independently of s−k, by (2) the participation constraint is still satisﬁed and, since the coeﬃcient
of pk(sk,¯ ek) in (1) has not changed, ¯ ek is still the optimal eﬀort. However, since E¯ eb(s) > 0, the
expected cost of the contract is lower, contradicting proﬁt maximization. Thus ¯ τk(sk,s −k) depends
only on sk.












s,s ∈ S (3)
ˆ ek is optimal for manager k given ˆ τk and
Eˆ e(ˆ xi) ≥ E¯ e(¯ xi),i∈ I, Eˆ e(vk(ˆ τk))− ck(ˆ ek) ≥ E¯ e(vk(¯ τk))− ck(¯ ek),k∈ K (4)
with strict inequality for some i or some k. By the same reasoning as above we know that there
exists a contract ˜ τk, which depends only on sk such that ˆ ek is optimal for this contract and
Eˆ ev(˜ τk)=Eˆ ev(ˆ τk), ˜ τk ≤
X
s−k∈S−k
p(s−k,ˆ e−k)(ˆ τk(sk,s −k))
9Since (˜ τk,ˆ ek) satisfy the (PCk) and (ICk) constraints, and since ˜ τk only depends on sk, it could
have been chosen in the maximization of expected proﬁt. It follows that
E¯ e(yk − ¯ τk)=
X
sk∈Sk
pk(sk,¯ ek)(yk − ¯ τk(sk) ≥
X
sk∈Sk
pk(sk,ˆ ek)(yk − ˜ τk(sk) ≥ Eˆ e(yk − ˆ τk) (5)
Suppose that in (4), it is investor i who is strictly better oﬀ, Eˆ e(ˆ xi) >E ¯ e(¯ xi). Then
P
i∈I Eˆ e(ˆ xi) >
P
i∈I E¯ e(¯ xi)=
P
k∈K Eˆ e(yk − ¯ τk) ≥
P
k∈K Eˆ e(yk − ˆ τk), which contradicts the feasibility condition
(3). Suppose that in (4), it is manager k who is strictly better oﬀ with (ˆ τk,ˆ ek). Then the ﬁrst
inequality in (5) must be strict, once again contradicting the feasibility condition (3). For suppose
that the ﬁrst inequality in (5) holds with equality. Since manager k is strictly better oﬀ with
(˜ τk,ˆ ek), the (PCk) constraint is not binding and −∞ <v k(˜ τk) implies ˜ τk ￿ 0. Thus for ￿>0
suﬃciently small and for each state sk ∈ Sk the manager’s reward can be decreased by ∆τk(sk)i n
such a way that
vk(˜ τk(sk) − ∆τk(sk)) = vk(˜ τk(sk))− ￿, sk ∈ Sk
The (PCk) constraint is still satisﬁed, and since Ee(vk(˜ τk − ∆τk)) = Ee(vk(˜ τk)) − ￿ for all e, the
optimal eﬀort is still ˆ ek. But the expected cost can be decreased by Eˆ e(∆τk), which contradicts
proﬁt maximization. 2
Since with risk neutral investors and independent ﬁrms an equilibrium is constrained Pareto
optimal, the ﬁrst-order conditions (i)-(iii) for an equilibrium must coincide with the ﬁrst-order
conditions (i)∗-(iii)∗, and it is instructive to understand why this is so. (i), (ii) and (i)∗, (ii)∗ clearly
coincide, so consider (iii) and (iii)∗. Let p0









so that by (ii) the contract of manager k only depends on sk and not on the realizations of other
ﬁrms: this property was also derived directly in the proof of Proposition 1 without using the FOCs.






































which is equal to zero since
P
sk∈Sk p0
k(sk,e k) = 0. The third term in (iii)∗ is zero since the incentive
constraint is binding. Since with linear preferences for the investors an interior allocation requires
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=0 ,k ∈ K






















































k(sk,e k)=0a n d
P
s−k∈S−k p(s−k,e −k) = 1, and, since risk neutrality implies πs =
1,s∈ S, (6) coincides with the ﬁrst term of (iii), and (iii)∗ coincides with (iii).
Since risk neutrality and independence play an essential role in showing the equivalence of (iii)
and (iii)∗, it seems likely that this equivalence will fail if either risk aversion or independence is not
satisﬁed.
2. Risk Averse Investors and Common Shocks
The analysis of the previous section suggests that a managerial equilibrium will cease to be
constrained eﬃcient if investors are risk averse or ﬁrms’ outcomes are inﬂuenced by common shocks.
The object of this section is to study the bias in the provision of managerial eﬀort introduced in
equilibrium by the presence of risk aversion on the part of the investors or by the presence of
common shocks underlying the random outcomes of ﬁrms.
Our procedure will be based on a comparison of the ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC)E and (FOC)CP
at an equilibrium and a constrained Pareto optimum respectively. More precisely the general pro-
cedure is as follows. Suppose (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e, ¯ π) is an interior managerial equilibrium. Under assumptions
which will be spelled out below, the ﬁrst-order approach (replacing the incentive constraints by the
ﬁrst-order condition (IC0
k)) is valid and there exist multipliers (¯ λ, ¯ β,¯ µ)=( ( ¯ λ)i∈I,(¯ βk, ¯ µk)k∈K) ≥ 0
such that (i)-(iii) in (FOC)E are satisﬁed. To evaluate the optimality of the equilibrium, consider
the social welfare function W¯ α,¯ β(x,τ,e) deﬁned in the previous section where the investors’ weights
¯ αi =1 /¯ λi,i∈ I, are the inverse of the marginal utilities of income and the managers’ weights
11¯ βk,k∈ K, are the multipliers of the participation constraints (PCk) . Let RCs(x,τ) and IC0
k(τ,e),
denote the functions which permit the resource and incentive constraints (RCs) and (IC0
k) in the
previous section to be written as RCs(x,τ)=0 ,s∈ S and IC0
k(τ,e)=0 ,k∈ K. Consider the
Lagrangian function ¯ L(x,τ,e) deﬁned by
¯ L(x,τ,e)=W¯ α,¯ β(x,τ,e)− ˆ πRC(x,τ)+¯ µIC0(τ,e)
where the multipliers (ˆ π, ¯ µ), with ˆ πs =¯ πsps(¯ e), are evaluated at the equilibrium. With this choice
of weights (¯ α, ¯ β) and multipliers (ˆ π, ¯ µ), it is clear that the ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC)E (i)-(ii)
and (FOC)CP (i∗)-(ii∗) coincide so that
Dx ¯ L(¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e)=0 ,D τ ¯ L(¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e)=0
If we can sign the gradient of ¯ L with respect to e, then we can deduce, at least locally, if there is
under or over provision of managerial eﬀort at equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e,¯ π) is an interior managerial equilibrium and if De ¯ L(¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e) ￿ 0, then
there exists a constrained feasible marginal reallocation
(¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e) −→ (¯ x +∆ x, ¯ τ +∆ τ,¯ e+∆ e)
with ∆e>0 which is Pareto improving.
Proof: It is convenient to introduce the following more condensed vector notation: let p(e)=
(ps(e))s∈S,u i(xi)=( ui(xi
s))s∈S,v k(τk)=( vk(τk
s ))s∈S and for a pair of vectors x,y ∈ |RS to let
x ◦ y =( xsys)s∈S denote the vector in |RS obtained by component-wise multiplication. Consider
any semi-positive3 marginal change in the vector of eﬀort levels of the managers ¯ e → ¯ e +∆ e with
∆e =( ∆ e1,...,∆eK) > 0. Choose a change ∆τk in the reward of each manager k ∈ K such that
the utility level of the manager is unchanged and the incentive constraint (IC0
k) stays satisﬁed to
terms of ﬁrst order. Thus for each k we must ﬁnd ∆τk ∈ |RS such that
p(¯ e) ◦ v0
k(¯ τk)∆τk + Dep(¯ e)∆e · vk(¯ τk) − c0(¯ ek)∆ek =0
Dekp(¯ e) ◦ v0
k(¯ τk)∆τk + D2
e,ekp(¯ e)∆e ·vk(¯ τk) − c00(¯ ek)∆ek =0
The vector p(¯ e)◦v0





= 0, the vector Dekp(¯ e)◦v0
k(¯ τk) has positive
and negative elements. Thus the two vectors are linearly independent, so that a solution ∆τk ∈ |RS
to this pair of equations always exists for each k ∈ K.
3For z ∈ R
K,z is semi-positive (we write z>0) if z ≥ 0 and z 6= 0).
12For each investor i =2 ,...,I choose a change in consumption ¯ xi → ¯ xi +∆ xi such that the
utility of investor i is unchanged
p(¯ e) ◦ u0
i(¯ xi)∆xi + Dep(¯ e)∆e · ui(¯ xi)=0




k∈K ∆τk = 0. Let ¯ L = L(¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e;ˆ π, ¯ µ); the change in L induced by the change (∆x,∆τ,∆e)
in the allocation satisﬁes
∆L = Dx ¯ L∆x + Dτ ¯ L∆τ + De ¯ L∆e>0
since Dx ¯ L = Dτ ¯ L = 0 and De ¯ L￿0. Since (∆x,∆τ,∆e) has been chosen so that ∆RC =0 ,
∆IC0 = 0, and the utility of all managers and investors except for investor 1 is unchanged, it
follows that ∆L =∆ W¯ α,¯ β = α1∆(p(¯ e)u1(¯ x1)) > 0, so that the reallocation (¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e) → (¯ x+∆x,¯ τ +
∆τ,¯ e+∆ e) is Pareto improving. 2
We analyze the eﬀect of removing the assumptions of investor risk neutrality and of indepen-
dence of ﬁrms’ outcomes separately. We begin by studying the eﬀect of risk aversion of investors.
2a. Risk Averse Investors
We retain the assumption that ﬁrms’ outcomes are independent, so that p(s,e)=
QK
k=1 pk(sk,e k)
and assume that there are not so many ﬁrms that the Law of Large Numbers applies, so that even
if investors are maximally diversiﬁed, there is risk in their equilibrium consumption streams. We
study the eﬀect of risk aversion of the investors on the equilibrium outcome. The next proposition
shows that under the relatively mild condition that the proﬁt received by investors from each ﬁrm
is an increasing function of the ﬁrm’s output, there is under provision of managerial eﬀort at an
equilibrium in the sense that there exists a marginal reallocation with higher eﬀort levels for the
managers which Pareto improves the equilibrium allocation. To establish this result we make the
following assumptions.
A1. The utility functions (vk)k∈K of managers are diﬀerentiable, increasing, strictly concave
and vk(c) →− ∞as c → 0, for all k ∈ K.
A2. The utility functions (ui)i∈I of investors are diﬀerentiable, increasing, strictly concave and
u0
i(c) →∞as c → 0, for all i ∈ I.
A3. Firms outcomes are independent.




is an increasing function of sk.
13A5. For all k ∈ K, and minsk(yk
sk) ≤ α<maxsk(yk
sk), 1 − Fk(α,ek) . =
P
{sk|yk
sk>α} pk(sk,e k)i s
a concave, increasing function of ek.
Proposition 3. Let A1-A5 be satisﬁed. If (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e,¯ π) is an interior managerial equilibrium
such that for all k ∈ K and all s−k ∈ S−k, yk
sk − ¯ τk(sk,s −k) is positive and increasing in sk, then
De ¯ L(¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e) ￿ 0.
Proof. Let (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e, ¯ π) be a managerial equilibrium. Assumptions A1, A4, A5 imply that the ﬁrst-
order approach is valid and that the ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC)E and (FOC)CP are satisﬁed at
equilibrium and at a CPO respectively.
Since at the equilibrium (iii) of (FOC)E holds, De ¯ L￿0 is equivalent to Ak(¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e) > 0 for all
k, where
Ak(¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e)=
∂ ¯ L
∂ek
− ¯ π ◦
∂p(¯ e)
∂ek





vk(¯ τk) − c00(¯ ek)
!
> 0,k ∈ K
i.e. Ak is obtained by subtracting (iii) from (iii)∗. Evaluating
∂ ¯ L
∂ek
and canceling terms gives




























































so that it only varies with sj.

























with ¯ αj = ¯ βj +¯ µj
p0
j(sj,¯ ej)
pj(sj,¯ ej). Thus Vs−k is the maximized social welfare function formed for all agents
except manager k, with managers weighted by their “incentive weights” ¯ αj. In view of A1 this
function is diﬀerentiable, increasing and strictly concave. If a vector (ξ∗
i ,i∈ I,ξ∗




















j). In addition, V 0
s−k(ξ)=ρ (see e.g. Magill-Quinzii (1996, p. 192)).
14For any s−k =( sj)j6=k ∈ S−k, let Y (s−k)=
P
j6=k yj
sj denote the production of all ﬁrms
excluding k. In state s =( sk,s −k), the investors and the managers other than k share the output
Y (s−k)+yk
sk − ¯ τk
s , and the ﬁrst-order conditions (i) and (ii) in (FOC)E imply that
Vs−k(Y (s−k)+( yk












sk − ¯ τk
s )) = ¯ πs =¯ π(sk,s −k). Thus Ak(¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e) can be written as










sk − ¯ τk(sk,s −k))
−V 0
s−k(Y (s−k)+yk
sk − ¯ τk(sk,s −k))(yk
sk − ¯ τk(sk,s −k))
i
,k ∈ K
Deﬁne φ(χ)=Vs−k(Y (sk)+χ)−V 0
s−k(Y (sk)+χ)χ. Then φ0(χ)=−V 00
s−k(Y (sk)+χ)χ>0,∀χ>0
since Vs−k is strictly concave, so that φ is an increasing function. The monotone likelihood ratio
condition A4 implies that if ¯ ek > ˜ ek, the distribution function F(σ, ¯ ek)=
P
sk≤σ pk(sk,¯ ek) ﬁrst-
order stochastically dominates F(σ, ˜ ek) (see Rogerson (1985)). It follows that if yk
sk − ¯ τk(sk,s −k)








sk − ¯ τk(sk,s −k))




sk − ¯ τk(sk,s −k)) > 0. Thus Ak(¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e) > 0 and
the proof is complete. 2
Remark 2. Proposition 3 requires that the payoﬀ to the shareholders be an increasing function of
the ﬁrm’s output (proﬁt). If the model is viewed as a discrete version of the model with continuous
outcomes then the condition requires that the slope dτk/dyk of the reward schedule tk(yk)o f
the manager of ﬁrm k be less than 1. This is a condition which is intuitively reasonable and
is certainly satisﬁed in practice for the observed compensation of CEOs. Murphy (1999) studies
the compensation of CEOs for a large sample of leading US corporations during the 1990’s and
in particular examines how CEO compensation increases (on average) when shareholder wealth
increase by 1000$: the maximum reported number is 35$ or a slope of 0.035. But of course we
cannot be sure that the observed compensation schemes are optimal or close to being optimal. For
the model studied in this paper it is easy to specify outputs (yk
sk), probability functions pk(sk,e k),
preferences ui and (vk,c k), and reservation utility (νk) for the managers, so that the resulting
equilibrium compensation (¯ τk) schedules satisfy this condition: but we have not found simple
clear-cut restrictions on the parameters of the model ensuring that it is always true in equilibrium.
15Remark 3. Note that Proposition 3 also holds when eﬀort is observable. This can be seen
by setting µk = 0 and ignoring the incentive constraints. Thus a managerial equilibrium with
observable eﬀort is not ﬁrst-best optimal. The ineﬃciency established in Proposition 3 does not
come from the moral hazard problem: rather it comes from the structural property of the model
by which a manager’s eﬀort aﬀects the probability of the ﬁrm’s outcome. In Magill-Quinzii (2002)
we studied an alternative modeling of moral hazard in which states of nature are known, but not
veriﬁable by third parties, and managerial eﬀort aﬀects the output produced in each state. In
that model an equilibrium is CPO:4 this comes from the fact that when managerial eﬀort aﬀects
quantities, prices give the right signals for choosing the managers’ contracts, since both investors
and ﬁrms choose quantities of income in each state, probabilities being exogenously given. In
the current model, ﬁrms take into account the fact that probabilities are inﬂuenced by eﬀort an
take as given the marginal utility of income in each state, while investors (as consumers) take the
probabilities as given and choose quantities. Thus there is no objective market signal of the value
of changing probability for investors (as consumers).
Remark 4. The key idea to the proof of Proposition 3 is that the planner in determining the
optimal eﬀort ek of manager k takes into account the change in the expected social welfare5 V (Y +
yk
sk −¯ τk
sk)sk∈Sk arising from the shift in probability across the stream of net outputs (yk
sk −¯ τk
sk)sk∈Sk,





Since V is a concave increasing function, V(Y + χ) − V 0(Y + χ)χ is increasing for χ>0, and the
function V (Y + χ) varies more than its “marginal function” V 0(Y + χ)χ, in the sense that
V(Y + χ2) − V (Y + χ1) >V0Y + χ1)χ1 − V 0(Y + χ2)χ2, whenever χ2 >χ 1 (8)
Thus the shift in the probabilities arising from an increment to the eﬀort ek of manager k creates
greater gains in the welfare function of the planner than in the equilibrium proﬁt function, so that
the eﬀort chosen by the planner is greater than that in the equilibrium. The diﬀerence between
the planner and the market’s evaluation in (8) is shown in Figure 1. V (Y +χ2)−V (Y +χ1) is the
area DCEFG, while V 0(¯ Y + χ1)χ1 − V 0(¯ Y + χ2)χ2 is the area CEFG minus the area ABCD, and
area CEFG−area ABCD<area CEFG<area DCEFG
The error in the market evaluation is ABCGD. As Figure 1b illustrates, the ﬂatter the marginal
function V 0(Y +χ), either because Y is large or because agents are less risk averse, the smaller the
4In Magill-Quinzii (2002) each owner-manager chooses his own contract by choosing a portfolio of stocks, bonds
and options. It can be shown however that the equilibrium is the same if ﬁrms’ shareholders choose the optimal
contract for the manager, given the appropriate participation and incentive constraints.




















Figure 1: Diﬀerence between planner and market evaluation (area ABCGD)
diference between the planner’s and the market’s evaluation, and hence the smaller the underin-
vestment in eﬀort at equilibrium.
2b. Common Shocks
In this section we analyze the setting where there is a mutual dependence among ﬁrms induced
by the presence of a common shock. To clearly understand the eﬀect of such a dependence on the
eﬃciency of the equilibrium we revert to the case of risk neutral investors, so that the ineﬃciency
studied in the previous section disappears.
The common shock is modeled as a random variable η with distribution function G(η). We
assume that, conditional on the value of η, ﬁrms outcomes are independent. For each ﬁrm k, let
ρk(sk,e k,η) denote the probability of the outcome yk
sk, given the eﬀort level ek and given a shock
η. Then the probability of the joint outcome s =( s1,...,s K) given the vector of eﬀort levels





If the shock η is observable and all the variables are indexed by the shock η, then the analysis of
Proposition 1 goes through, and a managerial equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient. We will examine
here the case where the shock η is not observable and cannot be deduced with certainty from the
17observed outcomes of the ﬁrms, so that contracts cannot be directly written conditional of the
value of η. We assume that investors and managers are symmetrically uninformed about the value
of η but know the distribution function G: thus for any agent in the economy the probability of an
outcome ys =( y1
s1,...,yK





As usual we will use either the notation p(s,e), or ps(e), or sometimes just ps, depending on the
complexity of the expression.
In this setting where η is not observable the contract of manager j will depend on the realized
outputs of the other ﬁrms since these realizations give information on the value of the common
shock and, by inference, on the likelihood that the outcome of ﬁrm j comes from a high or a
low eﬀort of manager j. The dependence of the contract of manager j on the outcome of ﬁrm k
introduces a dependence of this contract on the eﬀort of manager k, and hence an externality. A
(constrained) planner would take this externality into account, while the markets will not. Thus a
managerial equilibrium is typically not Pareto optimal. However the sign of the bias is less clear
than in the previous section. In Proposition 4 we show that under natural assumptions on the way
managerial eﬀort and the common shock interact in the determination of the probability of the
outcomes, the derivative of the Lagrangian of the social welfare function with respect to the eﬀort
of manager k, evaluated at the equilibrium allocation, is the sum of two terms, one positive, one
negative. We use an example to show when the positive or negative term dominates, that is when
there is under or over provision of eﬀort at equilibrium.
To analyze the eﬀect of a common shock we make the following assumptions on the character-
istics of the economy.
B1. The utility functions (vk)k∈K of managers are diﬀerentiable, increasing, strictly concave,
and vk(c) → 0a sc → 0, for all k ∈ K.





k∈K ρk(sk,e k,η)dG(η), for some distribution function G.




is an increasing function of sk.





sk>α} ρk(sk,e k,η)i sa
concave, increasing function of ek.




is an increasing function of sk.




is an decreasing function of η
B3 deﬁnes the probability structure: ﬁrms’ outcomes are aﬀected by the common shock η but,
conditional on the value of η, their outcomes are independent random variables. B4 and B5 are the
standard properties assumed in the principal-agent model, namely the monotone likelihood ratio
property and stochastic decreasing returns to eﬀort, which are assumed to hold for every value of
the common shock. B6 is the condition which ensures that a higher value of η is favorable to high
outcomes: it is equivalent to the property that, if η>η 0, the ratio of the likelihood of yk
sk with η
to the likelihood of yk










increases with sk. B7 is an assumption on the interaction between the eﬀect of managerial eﬀort
and the common shock. It is equivalent to the property that, for ek >e 0












decreases with η. The shock and eﬀort are in essence substitutes since increasing η decreases the
likelihood that yk
sk can be attributed to a high rather than a low eﬀort. If η were observable, the
compensation of manager k would decrease as η increases. When η is not observable but B6 holds,
the outcomes of ﬁrms j 6= k give information on the likelihood that η has been high or low, and
this leads to a monotone dependence of manager k’s compensation on the outcomes of other ﬁrms
j 6= k. We say that manager k’s compensation τk(sk,s −k) is decreasing in s−k if for all pairs of
outcomes s−k =( sj)j6=k and ˜ s−k =( ˜ sj)j6=k, with sj ≥ ˜ sj for all j 6= k and at least one strict
inequality, τk(sk,s −k) <τ k(sk,˜ s−k).
Lemma 1. Under the assumptions B1-B7, if (¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e, ¯ π) is an interior managerial equilibrium , then
for any k ∈ K and sk ∈ Sk, the contract ¯ τk(sk,s −k) is decreasing in s−k.
The proof is given in Magill-Quinzii (2004), as well as examples which do and do not satisfy B7.
Assumption B7 is satisﬁed when the probability ρk(sk,e k,η) depends additively on ek and η.
As we have pointed out, the fact that the compensation of the manager of one ﬁrm depends
on the outcomes of the other ﬁrms, which in turn depend on the eﬀort of their managers, implies
19that the eﬀort of manager k creates an external eﬀect on the other managers j 6= k. This external
eﬀect is not in the characteristics of the economy since, conditional on η, the ﬁrms’ outcomes are
independent: rather it comes from the combined non-observability of eﬀort and the common shock,
which makes it worthwhile for the shareholders of ﬁrm j to extract information by observing the
outcomes of the other ﬁrms. Since typically externalities are not properly taken into account in a
market equilibrium we should expect that ∂ ¯ L
∂ek is non zero. In the next propositon we show that
∂ ¯ L
∂ek can be decomposed into the sum of two terms, the direct eﬀect Dk, and the information eﬀect
Ik. The direct eﬀect is the most intuitive: since the payment of manager j decreases with the
outcome of ﬁrm k, increasing the eﬀort ek increases the probability of high values of sk, and this
decreases the welfare of manager j. The information eﬀect is more subtle and has its origin in the
fact that the likelihood ratio of one manager depends on the eﬀort of the other managers, so that a
change in the eﬀort ek changes the information on the eﬀort of manager j that can be deduced by
observing ﬁrm j ’s outcome. We will come back to the interpretation of the terms Dk and Ik which
are deﬁned in Proposition 4 after the proof. To sign these terms we need the assumption that the
managers’ utility levels are suﬃciently high: this is without loss of generality since the analysis
is invariant to adding constants to the utility functions (vk)k∈K (and of course to the guaranteed
utility levels νk).
Proposition 4. Let B1-B7 be satisﬁed. If (¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e, ¯ π) is an interior managerial equilibrium, then,










































s > 0, ∀s ∈ S, ∀k ∈ K (9)
then Dk < 0 and Ik > 0.
Proof: Let (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e, ¯ π) be an interior managerial equilibrium and let (¯ λ, ¯ β,¯ µ) be the associated
multipliers for which (FOC)E hold. Since investors are risk neutral we can assume that ¯ πs = 1 for
all s ∈ S and ¯ αi = 1
¯ λi = 1 for all i ∈ I. Since at the equilibrium the FOC for optimal eﬀort, (iii) of
20(FOC)E is satisﬁed for each ﬁrm it follows that







































s − ¯ τj
s), for all






























































s) and using equation (ii) in (FOC)E with
¯ πs = 1, gives the decomposition










































































Sign of Dj,k: Since ajvj + bj for aj > 0 represents the same preferences for manager j as vj
and since the consumption vector ¯ τj
s is bounded, we can assume without loss of generality that
21bj is chosen such that (9) holds. As we saw in the proof of Proposition 3, x → vj(x) − v0(x)x





s is decreasing in sk. Since 1 =
 








j is decreasing, ¯ τj
s




decreasing in sk. Thus the product
Hj(sk,s −k)=




























The monotone likelihood ratio implies that if ek >e 0
k the distribution function generated by







< 0 since Hj(sk,s −k) is decreasing in sk. Thus
Dj,k < 0.
































is a density function for the measure dG(η). Let Ga denote the dis-
tribution function induced by the density a with respect to dG. The integral (11) is the expectation










+c o v a(Lj,L k)









is the sign of the covariance term. By B7
the random variables Lj and Lk are decreasing functions of η, and are thus positively dependent
22random variables with respect to dGa. This in turn implies that cova(Lj,L k) is positive (see e.g.
Magill-Quinzii (1996, p.170)). 2
The general principle underlying an incentive contract is that the agent undertaking the eﬀort
should be paid more when the realized outcome is more likely to have occurred with high eﬀort,
and should be paid less when the outcome is more likely with low eﬀort. When outcomes are the
combined result of eﬀort and a common shock—and when the shock is not observable but also
aﬀects other ﬁrms—then the realized outcomes of these other ﬁrms provide information on the
shock, and this in turn provides information on the likelihood that a given outcome for the ﬁrm
is due to high or low eﬀort on the part of its manager. Since the outcomes of other ﬁrms are
also inﬂuenced by the eﬀort of their managers, the fact that observed outcomes are used to infer
information about the unobservable common shock introduces a dependence between the eﬀort of
manager k and the compensation of manager j 6= k. The contract of manager k in equilibrium
only takes into account the eﬀect of his eﬀort on the expected proﬁt of the ﬁrm and his expected
utility, but ignores its eﬀect on the compensation, and hence the expected utility, of the managers
of the other ﬁrms. Proposition 4 can be interpreted as a description of the additional eﬀects that
a planner would take into account when deciding on the eﬀort to induce from manager k.
The ﬁrst— the direct eﬀect—would take into account the eﬀect of ek on the expected utility of
manager j, where this utility is evaluated using the state-dependent weights ¯ αj





S, which are used to calculate the optimal risk for manager j given the need to induce appropriate
eﬀort on his part. Given the assumption of a decreasing likelihood ratio with respect to the common
shock, manager j is paid less when the outcome of ﬁrm k is higher: thus decreasing ek would increase
the expected utility of manager j.
The second eﬀect that the planner would take into account is that the eﬀort ek of manager k




, and hence the incentive-corrected weights of manager
j in the Lagrangian of the social welfare problem. Given the assumption on the way eﬀort and
the common shock inﬂuence the likelihood of the outcomes—in particular Assumption B7 which
in essence implies that managerial eﬀort and the common shock are substitutes in the creation of
good outcomes—increasing ek decreases the estimate of η from the observation of yk
sk, which in
turn increases the estimate of ej which can be inferred from a given realization yj
sj of ﬁrm j. Since
this eﬀect occurs through the likelihood ratio, or the information that can be inferred from a given
realization of ﬁrm j, we call it the information eﬀect.
23Example. The following example, which satisﬁes Assumptions B1-B7, is instructive for studying
which of the two eﬀects dominates, i.e. whether there is under or over provision of eﬀort at
equilibrium. Let K =2 ,S1 = {g1,b 1},S 2 = {g2,b 2}, S = S1 × S2, vk(c)=
1
1 − α
c1−α, 0 <α6=1 ,
and let the probabilities be given by
ρk(gk,e k,η)=ak + bkek + dη, 0 <a k + bk + d<1,ρ k(bk,e k,η)=1− ρk(gk,e k,η),k =1 ,2
where η is uniformly distributed on [0,1] and the cost functions c1(e1), and c2(e2) are such that e1
and e2 always lie in (0,1), i.e. ck(0) = 0, ck(ek) →∞as ek → 1.
To compute an equilibrium we need in addition to specify the outputs yk =( yk
gk,yk
bk)o ft h et w o
ﬁrms (k =1 ,2), the outside options (ν1,ν 2) and the cost functions (c1,c 2) of the two managers.
However since the expression (10) that we want to study only depends indirectly on these char-
acteristics through the resulting equilibrium values (¯ ek, ¯ βk, ¯ µk),k=1 ,2 , it is more convenient to
study (10) by treating the equilibrium values as parameters. For once (ak,b k,d,¯ ek, ¯ βk, ¯ µk),k=1 ,2
have been chosen, there exist characteristics (yk,ν k,c k),k =1 ,2, consumption streams, contracts















0 ρ1(s1,¯ e1,η)ρ2(s2,¯ e2,η)dη. Calculating
∂ ¯ L
∂ej
,j=1 ,2, and varying the parameters
(α,a,b,d,)(¯ e, ¯ β,¯ µ), we ﬁnd that the typical graph of
∂ ¯ L
∂ej
as a function of d—which parameterizes
the magnitude of the impact of the shock η on the probability of the outcomes of each ﬁrm—has
the form shown in Figure6 2.
When there is no common shock (d = 0) the equilibrium is eﬃcient. For small magnitudes
of d, the direct externality eﬀect dominates and
∂ ¯ L
∂ej
is negative: managers over invest in eﬀort.
When d is suﬃciently large, the information eﬀect—which, as we saw in the proof of Proposition
4, is a positive covariance term between two random variables jointly inﬂuenced by η—becomes
strong enough to dominate. To the extent that in practice the outcomes (proﬁts) of ﬁrms are quite
strongly correlated, it seems natural within the framework of this model to adopt a relatively large
value of d, so that the latter scenario seems more likely. Since, as we saw in Proposition 3, investors’
risk aversion also makes
∂ ¯ L
∂ej
positive, the eﬀect of risk aversion combined with that of a common
6Figure 2 has been obtained using the following values: a =( 0 .25,0.25),b=( 0 .2,0.2),α=0 .5, ¯ e =( 0 .2,0.2), ¯ β1 =
100, ¯ µ1 = 50.













as a function of d, which parameterizes the impact of
the common shock η on the probabilities.
unobservable shock seems likely to lead to under provision of eﬀort in equilibrium, in the sense of
Proposition 2.
2c. Continuum of Firms.
Many of the models which study moral hazard in a general equilibrium framework are motivated
by the problem of moral hazard in insurance, and make the assumption that there is a continuum of
agents of each type, a natural assumption in the context of insurance (Prescott-Townsend (1984a),
(1984b), Kocherlakota (1998), Lisboa (2001)). The papers just cited reach the conclusion that
an equilibrium is CPO, while we reach a diﬀerent conclusion. Thus it is instructive to see what
happens in our model if we replicate the ﬁrms and, in the limit, have a continuum of ﬁrms of each
type. We will not write out the details of the model for the continuum case, but rather indicate,
using the structure of our model, why the ineﬃciencies studied in Sections 2a and 2b disappear
when there is a continuum of ﬁrms of each type.
Consider ﬁrst the model of Section 2a and let us change the model by assuming that k ∈ K
represents a type of ﬁrm and that there is a continuum of mass 1 of identical ﬁrms of each type.
We assume that the probabilities of the outcomes of any two ﬁrms (whether of the same or of
diﬀerent types) are independent, and that ﬁrms of the same type k have identical managers (same
(vk,ν k,p k)). Assuming that all the managers of the same type are oﬀered the same contract
and choose the same eﬀort, in equilibrium as well as in the planner’s problem, the probabilities
pk(sk,e k),s k ∈ Sk of the outcomes of ﬁrms of type k become the proportion of ﬁrms of this type
25with output sk, so that the total output
P
sk pk(sk,e k)yk
sk of the ﬁrms of type k is non-random, and
increases with ek. The continuum of ﬁrms eliminates risk and thus the eﬀect of risk aversion studied
in Section 2a. Or, another way of looking at it, the trade-oﬀ between the cost of providing incentive
and the probability of good outcomes faced by an individual ﬁrm becomes, at the aggregate level, a
trade-oﬀ between quantity of output and cost of incentives, and the marginal value of more output
is well taken into account in the market.
For the model of Section 2b with a common shock, satisfying the assumptions B1-B7, consider
adding a continuum of ﬁrms of each type k ∈ K, assuming that the probabilities of the outcomes
of any two ﬁrms are independent conditional on the value of η. The continuum removes the
idiosyncratic shocks of ﬁrms from the aggregate: since the optimal eﬀort ek of a representative
manager can be deduced from the incentive contract of ﬁrms of type k, and since the proportion
of the ﬁrms with output sk can be observed, the probabilities ρ(sk,e k,η) can be inferred, and from
this the value of η can be deduced. Thus the continuum in essence transforms the unobservable η
into an observable or inferrable η, and this solves the information problem without introducing an
externality. Given Assumption B6 which implies that if η>η 0 the distribution function induced by




sk of the ﬁrms of type k is an increasing function of η. Thus the
optimal contract for the representative manager of a type k ﬁrm when η is known can equivalently
be expressed as a contract which depends on the total output of the ﬁrms of type k or the economy-
wide aggregate output. Thus even if there is a common shock, if there is a continuum of ﬁrms of
each type and investors are risk neutral, a managerial equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal.
In Sections 2a and 2b we have separated the eﬀect of risk aversionand the informationalproblem
induced by the unobservability of the common shock. In the case where there is a common shock
and investors are risk averse, constrained Pareto optimality will be obtained with a continuum of
ﬁrms if there are appropriate markets which permit the aggregate risk induced by η to be optimally
shared.
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